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Abstract
The authors compute welfare-maximizing Taylor rules in a dynamic general-equilibrium model of
a small open economy. The model includes three types of nominal rigidities (domestic-goods
prices, imported-goods prices, and wages) and eight different structural shocks. The authors
estimate the model’s structural parameters by maximum likelihood using Canadian and U.S. data,
and use a second-order approximation of the model to measure the welfare effects of different
Taylor rules. By estimating the model, the authors can compare welfare levels with that attainable
under the Taylor rule estimated for their sample period. They ﬁnd that the welfare gains from
moving to the optimal Taylor rule are larger than those obtained by previous researchers.
JEL classiﬁcation: F2, F31, F33
Bank classiﬁcation: Economic models; Exchange rates; Inﬂation targets
Résumé
Les auteurs se servent d’un modèle dynamique d’équilibre général décrivant une petite économie
ouverte pour calculer les coefﬁcients de la règle de Taylor qui maximisent le bien-être. Le modèle
englobe trois types de rigidités nominales (les prix des biens produits au pays, ceux des biens
importés et les salaires sont ﬁxés à l’avance) et huit chocs structurels différents. Les auteurs
estiment les paramètres structurels du modèle en appliquant la méthode du maximum de
vraisemblance aux données canadiennes et américaines et font appel à une approximation
d’ordre 2 du modèle pour mesurer les effets de différentes règles de Taylor sur le bien-être. Les
auteurs peuvent ainsi comparer les niveaux de bien-être à celui qu’ils obtiennent avec la règle de
Taylor estimée sur la période observée. Ils constatent que les gains de bien-être découlant de
l’adoption d’une règle de Taylor optimale sont supérieurs à ceux décrits par les chercheurs
précédents.
Classiﬁcation JEL : F2, F31, F33
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Modèles économiques; Taux de change; Cibles en matière
d’inﬂation1. Introduction
A large literature analyzes optimal monetary policy in the context of the New Open-Economy
Macroeconomics (NOEM), a class of open-economy dynamic general-equilibrium (DGE)
models with explicit microfoundations, nominal rigidities, and imperfect competition.1 Gal¶ ³
and Monacelli (1999) show, using a model with instantaneous pass-through of exchange rate
changes to domestic prices, that optimal monetary policy is identical in open and closed
economies and involves stabilizing the overall price level, without regard to exchange rate
°uctuations. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) show that, with slow pass-through, this is no
longer the case: it is optimal for the central bank to minimize a consumer price index
(CPI)-weighted average of markups charged in the domestic market by domestic and foreign
producers. Much of this literature uses highly stylized models with analytical solutions.
Recently, more fully developed models have been used. Smets and Wouters (2002) show
that optimal monetary policy with sticky domestic-goods prices and imported-goods prices
involves minimizing a weighted average of domestic and import price in°ation.
In this paper, we analyze optimal monetary policy (within a class of simple monetary
rules) in a NOEM model of a small open economy with three types of nominal rigidities:
wages and both domestic and imported goods prices are set in advance by monopolistically
competitive agents. The model also incorporates eight di®erent types of structural shocks.
We estimate the model's structural parameters with Canadian and U.S. data using maximum
likelihood via the Kalman ¯lter. We then use the model to compute welfare-maximizing
Taylor rules, in order to set domestic short-term interest rates. For these computations,
we use a second-order approximation around the model's deterministic steady state. This
methodology captures the e®ect of the Taylor rule coe±cients on the stochastic means of
consumption, leisure, and real balances, as well as on their variances. Recent studies, such
as by Kim and Kim (2003), show that solving models using ¯rst-order approximations can
lead to misleading welfare comparisons.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. Our estimates for most of the model's
parameters are precise. They are compatible with other small open-economy models in the
NOEM literature, such as by Bergin (2003) and Dib (2003). The optimal Taylor rule in-
volves responding more strongly to °uctuations in GDP than the Bank of Canada has done
historically, and less strongly to °uctuations in money-supply growth. The gains from opti-
mal monetary policy are quite substantial: the gain in welfare is equivalent to a permanent
increase of 1.40 per cent in the level of consumption compared with the level of welfare
under the historical (estimated) values of the Taylor rule coe±cients. The optimal Taylor
rule places the economy very close to a region in parameter space that implies local inde-
1The NOEM literature, spawned by the pioneering work of Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995), has been successful
in explaining phenomena such as high real exchange rate volatility and the strong impact of monetary policy
shocks on real exchange rates. See Sarno (2001), Lane (2001), and Bowman and Doyle (2003) for recent
surveys.
1terminacy. Placing restrictions on the Taylor rule coe±cients to move the economy further
away from the region of local indeterminacy results in a smaller welfare gain.
Our results di®er from those in the existing literature in three main respects. First, our
estimate of the welfare gain from optimal monetary policy is larger than in other recent pa-
pers that analyze optimal monetary policy in small open economies (for example, Kollmann
2002 and Smets and Wouters 2002).
Second, we show that most of the welfare gains from optimized monetary policy come
from its e®ects on the average levels of the arguments of the utility function, rather than from
its e®ects on their second moments. This underscores the importance of using higher-order
approximations to solve the model. If the model is solved using a ¯rst-order approximation,
measured welfare gains by construction can be obtained only by reducing the size of the
°uctuations of variables around their steady-state means. This explains why many previous
studies have found very small potential bene¯ts from optimal monetary policy.
Third, since we estimate the model's structural parameters, we can compare welfare under
the optimal Taylor rule with welfare under the historical (estimated) values of the Taylor rule
coe±cients. Previous studies have compared welfare under optimal Taylor rules with welfare
in the deterministic steady state. The deterministic steady state has the advantage of being
invariant to the monetary policy rule and to the variance-covariance matrix of shocks. On the
other hand, the deterministic steady-state levels of consumption, leisure, and real balances
can be quite di®erent from the average values around which these variables °uctuate, because
shocks can a®ect the stochastic means of the economy's endogenous variables.2 Measuring
welfare gains against the deterministic steady state means using a state in which the economy
rarely, if ever, ¯nds itself as a benchmark.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model. In
section 3, we discuss the estimation strategy used to attribute values to the model's struc-
tural parameters and the parameter estimates themselves. We discuss the calculation of
the optimal Taylor rule and report our results concerning the bene¯ts of optimal monetary
policy in section 4. Section 5 o®ers some conclusions. Our data sources are summarized in
Appendix A. Appendix B summarizes the model's equilibrium conditions.
2. The Model
The economy faces ¯xed prices on world markets for imported goods. Its domestic output,
however, is an imperfect substitute for foreign goods, so that it faces a downward-sloping
demand curve for its output on world markets. It also faces an upward-sloping supply curve
for funds on international capital markets.
2This phenomenon is obscured when using a ¯rst-order approximation to solve the model. With a
¯rst-order approximation, the model's endogenous variables are, on average, equal to their deterministic
steady-state values.
2Di®erent labour types are associated with particular households that act as monopolis-
tic competitors in the labour market. Di®erentiated intermediate goods are produced by
monopolistically competitive domestic ¯rms that use labour and a ¯nal composite good as
inputs. Di®erentiated intermediate goods are also imported by monopolistically competitive
importers. Domestic and imported intermediate goods are aggregated by competitive ¯rms
to form a composite domestic and a composite imported good. Some of the composite do-
mestic good is exported. The remainder is combined with the composite imported good to
form the ¯nal good. As in McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2001), imports enter the produc-
tion process rather than being consumed directly.3 The ¯nal good is used for consumption,
government consumption, and as an input into the production of domestic intermediate
goods.
There are, therefore, three sources of monopoly distortion and nominal rigidities: house-
holds set wages in advance, and both importers and producers of domestic intermediate
goods set prices in advance. Following Calvo (1983), price- and wage-setters maintain con-
stant prices and wages unless they receive a signal to revise them, which arrives at the
beginning of each period with a constant probability. This makes aggregation simple, allows
us to easily vary the average duration of the nominal rigidities, and allows us to estimate
the length of the nominal rigidities and other structural parameters of the model.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of di®erent households on the unit interval, indexed by j. The jth













where ¯ is the discount factor, E0 is the conditional-expectations operator, Ct(j) is consump-
tion, Mt(j) denotes nominal money balances held at the end of the period, Pt is the price



















+ ´ log(1 ¡ ht(j)); (2)
where ° and ´ are positive parameters. Total time available to the household in the period is
normalized to one. This functional form of the period utility function leads to a conventional
money-demand equation in which the short-term nominal interest rate is the opportunity
cost of holding money, ¡° is the interest elasticity of money demand, and consumption
3Bergin (2003) and Kollmann (2002) develop models that are similar in this respect.
3is the scale variable. The bt term is a shock to money demand. It follows the ¯rst-order
autoregressive process, given by:
log(bt)=( 1¡ ½b)log(b)+½b log(bt¡1)+"bt; (3)
with 0 <½ b < 1 and where the serially uncorrelated shock, "bt, is normally distributed with
















t¡1(j)+Tt + Dt; (4)
where Wt(j) is the nominal wage rate set by the household. Labour income is taxed at an
average marginal tax rate, ¿t. B¤
t and D
g
t are foreign-currency and domestic-currency bonds
purchased in t, and et is the nominal exchange rate. Domestic-currency bonds are used by the
government to ¯nance its de¯cit. Rt and R¤
t denote, respectively, the gross nominal domestic
and foreign interest rates between t and t +1 ;·t is a risk premium that re°ects departures
from uncovered interest parity. The household also receives nominal pro¯ts, Dt = Dd
t +Dm
t ,
from domestic producers and importers of intermediate goods, and Tt is nominal lump-sum















t is the GDP de°ator or domestic-output price index. The risk premium ensures
that the model has a unique steady state. If domestic and foreign interest rates are equal,
the time paths of domestic consumption and wealth follow random walks.4
The foreign nominal interest rate, R¤








with 0 <½ R¤ < 1 and where the serially uncorrelated shock, "R¤t, is normally distributed
with zero mean and standard deviation ¾R¤.













4For an early discussion of this problem, see Giavazzi and Wyplosz (1984). Our risk-premium equation
is similar to the one used by Senhadji (1997). For alternative ways of ensuring that stationary paths exist
for consumption in small open-economy models, see Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2003).
4Household j chooses Ct(j), Mt(j), D
g
t(j), and B¤
t(j) (and Wt(j) if it is allowed to change
its wage), to maximize the expected discounted sum of its utility °ows, subject to three
relationships: the budget constraint (equation (4)), intermediate ¯rms' demand for their











where ¾ is the elasticity of substitution between di®erent labour skills. This implies the






























































































where ¤t(j) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the time t budget constraint. With











l=0(¯dw)l(1 ¡ ¿t+l)ht+l(j)¤t+l(j)=P d
t+l
: (12)
5This ¯rst-order condition gives a New Keynesian Phillips curve for wage in°ation (see section









where ~ Wt is the average wage of those workers who revise their wage at time t.
2.2 Goods production
2.2.1 Domestic intermediate goods
Firms have identical production functions, given by:
Yt(i)=Xt(i)
Á (Atht(¢;i))
1¡Á ;Á 2 (0;1); (14)
where ht(¢;i) is the quantity of the aggregate labour input employed by ¯rm i and Xt(i)
is the quantity of the ¯nal composite good used by ¯rm i.5 At is an aggregate technology
shock that follows the stochastic process, given by:
log(At)=( 1¡ ½A)log(A)+½A log(At¡1)+"At; (15)
where "At is a normally distributed, serially uncorrelated shock with zero mean and standard
deviation ¾A. The ¯rm chooses Xt(i) and ht(¢;i) to maximize its stock market value. When
allowed to do so (with probability (1¡dp) each period), it also chooses the price of its output,
~ P d




















where ¤t is the marginal utility of wealth for a representative household, and
D
d
t+l(i) ´ ~ P
d
t (i)Yt+l(i) ¡ Wt+lht+l(¢;i) ¡ Pt+lXt+l(i);
where Pt is the price of the ¯nal output good, Zt. The maximization is subject to the ¯rm's










5We include Xt(i) in the production of domestic intermediate goods for two reasons. First, without Xt(i),
the response of the real wage to demand shocks is too highly countercyclical. Second, as shown in similar
models by McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2001), the presence of intermediates in the production function for
domestic goods a®ects the correlation between the nominal exchange rate and domestic in°ation.
6where P d
t is the exact price index of the composite domestic good. The elasticity of the







































where »t(i) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the production-function constraint. It
measures the ¯rm's real marginal cost. The ¯rst-order condition with respect to the ¯rm's
price relates the price to the expected future price of ¯nal output and to expected future
real marginal costs. It can be used to derive a New Keynesian Phillips curve relationship for
the rate of change of domestic output prices (see section 2.6).
2.2.2 Imported intermediate goods
The economy imports a continuum of foreign intermediate goods on the unit interval. There
is monopolistic competition in the market for imported intermediates, which are imperfect
substitutes for each other in the production of the composite imported good, Y m
t , produced
by a representative competitive ¯rm. When allowed to do so (with probability (1¡dm) each
period), the importer of good i sets the price, ~ P m









































For convenience, we assume that the price in foreign currency of all imported intermediates
is P ¤
t , which is also equal to the foreign price level. The elasticity of the derived demand for





























This equation can be used to derive a New Keynesian Phillips curve relationship for the rate
of change of intermediate input prices (see section 2.6).
72.2.3 Composite goods
The composite domestic good, Yt, is produced using a constant elasticity of substitution





















subject to the production function (24). The ¯rst-order conditions yield the derived demand
functions for the domestic intermediate goods given by (17). The exact price index for the













This price index corresponds to a producer price index (PPI) for the economy. The price















where ~ P d
t is the price index derived by aggregating over all ¯rms that change their price at
time t.
Composite domestic output, Yt, is divided between domestic use, Y d
t , and exports, Y x
t .














t is foreign output.7 The elasticity of demand for domestic output is ¡&, and ®x > 0
is a parameter that determines the fraction of domestic exports in foreign spending. Domestic
exports form an insigni¯cant fraction of foreign expenditures, and have a negligible weight
in the foreign price index.
6This condition can be derived from a foreign importing ¯rm that combines non-perfectly substitutable
imported goods.
7To ensure the existence of a balanced growth path for the economy, we assume that foreign output grows
at the same trend rate as domestic output.
8The foreign variables P ¤
t and Y ¤



















where ¼¤ is steady-state foreign in°ation, and "¼¤t and "y¤t are zero-mean, serially uncorre-
lated shocks with standard errors ¾¼¤ and ¾y¤, respectively.
The composite imported good, Y m
t , is produced using a CES technology with a continuum
of imported intermediate goods, Y m














It is produced by a representative competitive ¯rm. The ¯rm's pro¯t maximization gives









































where ~ P m
t is a price index derived by aggregating over all importers that change their price
in time t.
2.2.4 Final goods
The ¯nal good, Zt, is produced by a competitive ¯rm that uses Y d
t and Y m
t as inputs subject





















9where ®d > 0, ®m > 0, º>0, and ®d + ®m = 1. The ¯nal good, Zt, is used for domestic
consumption, Ct, as inputs to produce domestic intermediate goods, Xt, and government














































In our model { following Taylor (1993), Dib (2003), and Ireland (2003), among others { the
central bank manages the short-term nominal interest rate, Rt, in response to °uctuations in
CPI in°ation (¼t = Pt=Pt¡1), money growth (¹t = Mt=Mt¡1), and output (Yt). The interest
rate reaction function of the central bank is given by:
log(Rt=R)=%¼ log(¼t=¼)+%¹ log(¹t=¹)+%y log(Yt=Y)+"Rt; (40)
where ¼, ¹, and Y are the steady-state values of ¼t, ¹t, and Yt; R is the steady-state value
of the gross nominal interest rate; and "Rt is a zero-mean, serially uncorrelated monetary
policy shock with standard deviation ¾R. The error term arises from the fact that the central
bank can control short-term interest rates only indirectly by setting the Bank Rate. The
error term thus re°ects developments in money and ¯nancial markets that are not explicitly
captured by our model.
Money growth is included as an argument in the Taylor rule because of the inclusion of
money-demand shocks in our model. They turn out to be important empirically and account
for a signi¯cant fraction of °uctuations in output and in°ation. If the central bank reacted
only to in°ation, money-demand shocks could be exacerbated by the bank's behaviour, since
a positive money-demand shock would lead to a decrease in in°ation, a reduction in short-
term interest rates, and thereby to an endogenous increase in money demand. The inclusion
of CPI in°ation rather than PPI in°ation is motivated by the fact that the Bank of Canada
10does in fact target CPI in°ation; also, reacting to CPI in°ation allows for an indirect channel
for reacting to exchange rate movements, since exchange rate °uctuations may be passed
through much more quickly to the CPI than to the PPI.8
2.4 The government
The government's budget constraint is given by:
PtGt + Tt + D
g






The left side of (41) represents the uses of government revenue: goods purchases, transfers,
and debt repayments. The right side includes tax revenues, money creation, and newly issued
debt. The government also faces a no-Ponzi constraint that implies that the present value




Because households have in¯nite horizons, there is Ricardian equivalence in the following
sense: given the tax rate on labour income, a change in the mix between lump-sum taxes and
borrowing does not a®ect the economy's equilibrium. We can simplify the budget constraint
without loss of generality to:
PtGt + Tt = ¿tWtht + Mt ¡ Mt¡1: (42)
This implies that D
g
t is zero in each period. Government spending and the tax rate are
determined by:
log(Gt)=( 1¡ ½g)log(G)+½g log(Gt¡1)+"gt; (43)
and
log(¿t)=( 1¡ ½¿)log(¿)+½¿ log(¿t¡1)+"¿t: (44)
Given these stochastic processes, and that the nominal money stock is determined by money
demand once the nominal interest rate is set, lump-sum taxes are determined residually to
balance the government's budget.
2.5 Equilibrium
There are two di®erent stochastic trends in the model. The ¯rst is in the foreign price level,
and arises from the speci¯cation of the stochastic process for P ¤
t in terms of rates of change in
equation (29). The second is in the price of domestic output and all other domestic nominal
variables, and arises from the fact that the monetary authority adjusts the domestic nominal
interest rate as a function of in°ation rather than the price level, according to equation (40).
8Ambler, Dib, and Rebei (2003) present evidence that this is indeed the case for Canada.
11Solving the model involves using stationary transformations of variables with unit roots.
We use the following transformations: pt ´ Pt=P d
t , mt ´ Mt=Pt, pm






t , ¼t ´ Pt=Pt¡1, ¼d
t ´ P d
t =P d
t¡1, wt ´ Wt=P d
t , ¼¤






st ´ etP ¤
t =P d
t . Appendix B provides the complete system of equations in stationary variables
that characterize the model's equilibrium.
2.6 New Keynesian Phillips curves
The price- and wage-setting equations cannot be used directly to simulate the model, since
they involve in¯nite summations. By linearizing these equations around the steady-state
values of the variables, and assuming zero in°ation in the steady state, we obtain three
New Keynesian Phillips curves relationships that determine the rates of in°ation of locally





t ´Wt=Wt¡1, we get:
^ ¼
d
t = ¯^ ¼
d
t+1 +





t = ¯^ ¼
m
t+1 +


















^ ¿t ¡ ^ wt
¸
; (47)
where hats over variables denote deviations from steady-state values. The New Keynesian
Phillips curve for domestic output in°ation is the same as in Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999). It
relates in°ation to expected future in°ation and to the real marginal cost of output. The
equation for import-price in°ation is analogous with real marginal cost captured by the real
exchange rate. The wage-in°ation equation is also analogous. The term in square brackets
measures the marginal rate of substitution (the real marginal cost to workers of their work
e®ort) minus the real wage. The household's ¯rst-order condition for the nominal wage can
be interpreted as a markup over the average marginal cost of work e®ort over the life of the
wage contract.
3. Model Solution and Parameter Estimation
To estimate the model's parameters, we use a linear approximation around its steady state,
but for welfare analysis we use a higher-order approximation using the Dynare program
(Juillard 2002). Blanchard and Kahn's (1980) algorithm is used to solve the linearized
model. It leads to a state-space representation, with transition equations for the model's
12predetermined endogenous state variables and observation equations relating those states
to observable macroeconomic aggregates. The model's forward-looking or jump-state vari-
ables are eliminated from the state transition equations by Blanchard and Kahn's solution
procedure. In the notation of Ireland (2004), we have:
st = Ast¡1 + B"t; (48)
The model is completed by the following set of observation equations that relate the model's
state variables to observable endogenous variables:
ft = Cst: (49)
The column vector st¡1 contains the predetermined endogenous state variables of the model:
st¡1






t¡1 ;w t¡1 ;p
m
t¡1 ;m t¡1 ;b
¤
t¡1];
with all variables made stationary and measured in proportional deviations from their steady-
state values. With eight structural shocks in the model, we include a vector of eight observa-
tion equations to avoid the stochastic singularity problem discussed by Ingram, Kocherlakota,
and Savin (1994). This problem stems from the fact that, with more than eight observation
equations, there would be exact or deterministic relationships among certain combinations
of the model's endogenous variables. If these relationships did not hold exactly in the data,
estimation by the maximum-likelihood procedure would break down. We include the ¯ve
state variables that are directly observable, as well as consumption, CPI in°ation, and the
domestic interest rate:
ft







with all variables measured in proportional deviations from their steady-state values.
The Kalman ¯lter is used to write down the model's log-likelihood function given its
state-space representation.9 The same estimation method is used by Dib (2003) and Ireland
(2003). The parameters are then estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function over
the sample period from 1981Q3 to 2002Q4.
3.1 Parameter estimates
Table 1 summarizes our parameter estimates. Not counting constants in the stochastic
processes for the model's forcing variables, the model has 36 structural parameters. Of
these, we are unable to estimate six, because they are poorly identi¯ed. These parameters
are assigned calibrated values.
9See Hamilton (1994, chapter 13) or Ireland (2004) for detailed descriptions.
13The subjective discount rate, ¯, is given a standard value, which implies an annual
real interest rate of 4 per cent in the steady state. The weight on leisure in the utility
function, ´, is calibrated so that the representative household spends about one-third of its
total time working in the steady state. The ®x parameter is a normalization that ensures
that the current account is balanced in the long run. The demand elasticities, ¾, µ, and #,
in°uence the stochastic properties of the model in a very indirect way. After linearization,
they no longer appear in the three New Keynesian Phillips curve equations. By in°uencing
the size of the markups over marginal cost, they do in°uence the steady-state levels of the
domestic production of intermediate goods, imported intermediate goods, and employment.
Because certain coe±cients in the linearized model depend on the steady-state levels of
endogenous variables, the moments predicted by the model are related to these parameters.
Unfortunately, the in°uence is so weak that it is impossible to estimate them precisely. The
µ and # parameters give the elasticity of substitution across di®erent types of intermediate
goods in the production of the composite domestic good and the composite imported good.
Setting µ = # = 8 gives a steady-state markup of 14 per cent, which agrees well with estimates
in the empirical literature of between 10 per cent and 20 per cent (see, for example, Basu
1995). The ¾ parameter gives the elasticity of substitution across di®erent labour types in
the production of individual domestic intermediate goods. The value ¾ = 6 corresponds to
estimates from microdata in Gri±n (1992).10
Of the estimated parameters in Table 1, most have small standard errors and are highly
signi¯cant. In particular, the nominal rigidity parameters are highly signi¯cant. They are
of plausible magnitude, and within the range of values in previous empirical studies and
calibrated general-equilibrium models. The estimate of dp implies that the prices of domestic
intermediate goods remain ¯xed for, on average, 1.78 quarters. The other prices are revised
less often, on average, but are still well within the range of plausibility. Import prices remain
¯xed for slightly more than two quarters, on average. Nominal wages remain ¯xed for 5.37
quarters, on average.
The estimated values of the Taylor rule imply, since the sum of %¼ and %¹ is greater than
unity, that the long-run level of the in°ation rate is determinate and the model is saddlepoint
stable, with a unique dynamic solution in response to shocks. The value of %y suggests that,
during the sample period, the Bank of Canada intervened only weakly if at all to °uctuations
in real output.11
The stochastic processes for the model's forcing variables are highly persistent. Except for
½¼¤ =0 :2054 and ½¿ =0 :4320, the estimated AR(1) parameters are greater than 0.64. The
10It also agrees with the value estimated in Ambler, Guay, and Phaneuf (2003) using aggregate time-series
data. They succeed in estimating the value of the equivalent parameter in their model by calibrating the
equivalent of the dw parameter.
11We also allow monetary policy to respond to real exchange rate °uctuations in some of our estimations.
The coe±cient is very small in magnitude and insigni¯cant. We do not allow for regime shifts when estimating
the Taylor rule coe±cients.
14standard deviations of the innovations to the processes vary widely in magnitude, ranging
from 0.0016 in the case of foreign interest rate shocks to 0.0718 in the case of money-demand
shocks. The volatility of foreign shocks is smaller than that of domestic shocks, which
suggests the relative importance of domestic shocks for business cycle °uctuations in the
Canadian economy.
Figure 1 shows the ¯tted and (within sample) predicted values of several of the model's
time series (with error terms in the observation equations set equal to zero). For the series
that are used to construct the model's likelihood function, the ¯t is quite good. The model
does have di±culty tracking the nominal and real exchange rate series, even within sample.
This is not surprising, given the generally poor performance of structural exchange rate
models and the fact that the real and nominal exchange rates were not included among the
observable variables used to construct the likelihood function.
4. Optimal Monetary Policy
Given the estimated and calibrated values of the model's structural parameters, we optimized
over the three coe±cients of the Taylor rule to ¯nd the values that maximize unconditional
welfare. The maximization problem can be written as follows:
max
%¼;%¹;%y
E fu(Ct;m t;h t)g: (50)
The solution amounts to maximizing welfare in the steady state.12 It ignores any costs
involved in the transition between the initial stochastic steady state with estimated values
of the Taylor rule coe±cients and the new stochastic steady state with optimized Taylor rule
coe±cients.
It has been known for some time that, for the purposes of welfare evaluation in DGE
models, ¯rst-order approximations of their equilibrium conditions may not be adequate.13
Kim and Kim (2003) provide a simple example of a model in which welfare appears higher
under autarky than under complete markets, because of the inaccuracy of the linearization
method.14 To avoid this problem, we compute the welfare-maximizing Taylor rules, using the
Dynare program. Dynare calculates a second-order approximation of the model around its
deterministic steady state. We use the program to calculate the theoretical ¯rst and second
12It has become standard practice to abstract from welfare gains and losses that result from changes in
real money balances. Because we ¯nd empirically that money-demand shocks explain a substantial fraction
of output °uctuations, we do not shut down the e®ects of money-demand shocks on the model.
13Woodford (2001, chapter 6) describes a series of conditions under which ¯rst-order approximations of
the policy functions in DGE models are adequate for evaluating social welfare. The conditions do not hold
here: the main condition that fails is that, because of distortions that result from monopolistic competition,
the deterministic steady state of the model has an allocation of resources that is not Pareto optimal.
14See Kim et al. (2003) for a more general discussion.
15moments of the model's endogenous variables, including period utility. Table 2 reports our
main results. The second column of the table reproduces the historical (estimated) values of
the Taylor rule coe±cients from Table 1 to facilitate comparison with their optimized values.
The third column shows the optimized Taylor rule coe±cients. The fourth column shows
the Taylor rule coe±cients for an in°ation stabilization scenario in which the central bank
pays attention only to in°ation and strongly resists °uctuations in the in°ation rate around
its long-run average value.
We measure the welfare gain associated with a particular monetary policy by means of
the compensating variation. This measures the percentage change in consumption given
the equilibrium with the historical values of the Taylor rule coe±cients that would give
households the same unconditional expected utility as in the aforementioned scenario. The
compensating variation is de¯ned as follows:







where variables that do not have asterisks are under the historical values of the Taylor
rule coe±cients, and variables that do have asterisks are under the proposed Taylor rule
coe±cients. The fourth row of Table 2 reports the compensating variations associated with
the optimal Taylor rule and the anti-in°ation scenario.
The results are striking. The compensating variation for the optimal Taylor rule is
quite large. Consumption in each period would have to increase by 1.40 per cent in the
model with the historical values of the Taylor rule coe±cients for agents to be as well o® as
with the optimal coe±cients. This is larger than the welfare gain calculated by Kollmann
(2002). Before comparing our welfare gain with Kollmann's, it is important to note that he
measures his welfare gains with respect to the level of welfare in the deterministic steady
state, in which the variance of each shock is set equal to zero, rather than with respect to
the stochastic steady state with historical values of the Taylor rule coe±cients, as we do.15
His compensating variation is 0.39 per cent. Note from Table 3 that, in our model, the
deterministic steady state gives a welfare improvement over the stochastic steady state with
the historical Taylor rule coe±cients. The size of the compensating variation is 0.37 per cent.
The welfare gain in our model compared with the deterministic steady state is therefore equal
to 1.02 per cent in terms of compensating variation, just over two and one half times the
increase in Kollmann's model. Even when the monetary policy has in°ation stabilization as
its exclusive focus, there is a substantial welfare gain compared with the stochastic steady
state with the historical values of the Taylor rule coe±cients: the compensating variation is
equal to 0.73 per cent.
Compared with the historical values of the Taylor rule coe±cients, monetary policy with
the optimal Taylor rule responds more strongly to °uctuations in in°ation and output, and
15Kollmann calibrates, rather than estimates, his model. Therefore, he has no estimated historical values
of the Taylor rule coe±cients with which to measure welfare.
16less strongly to °uctuations in the growth of nominal balances. Despite these di®erences,
the coe±cients of the optimized Taylor rule are quite close to the corresponding historical
values, which suggests that the measured welfare gains may be sensitive to small variations
in the Taylor rule coe±cients. This is con¯rmed by a detailed analysis of the shape of the
welfare function in the space of the Taylor rule coe±cients.
Figure 2 shows the shape of the welfare function in the %¼=%y plane, holding constant the
value of %¹ at its optimal level of zero. The level of period utility in the neighbourhood of
the optimum takes the form of a tall, narrow peak. The location of the peak depends on the
values of the model's structural parameters. Even if our model is correctly speci¯ed, small
errors in our point estimates due to sampling uncertainty may mean that the level of period
utility is in the surrounding plain, rather than at or near the peak. In addition, the peak
is quite close to the region of parameter values in which the model is locally indeterminate.
Local indeterminacy occurs when the number of stable roots of the linearized model is
greater than the number of predetermined variables. In this case, there are an in¯nite
number of dynamic paths that converge to the model's deterministic steady state, starting
in the immediate neighbourhood of that steady state, and sunspot equilibria are a possibility.
Roughly speaking, the model is locally indeterminate when
%¼ + %¹ ¡ %y · 1:0:
Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2004) restrict the policy rules they consider to yield a locally
unique equilibrium within a radius of 0.15 around the optimized coe±cients. They note (p.
20) that \welfare computations near a bifurcation point may be inaccurate." Restricting the
coe±cients of the Taylor rule so that
%¼ + %¹ ¡ %y ¸ 1:15
leads to the welfare contours shown in Figure 3. For small values of %¹ (less than two),
welfare is increasing in the value of %¼, but is less than the optimal level of welfare attainable
without imposing this additional restriction.
4.1 Level e®ect versus stabilization e®ect
Because the model is solved using a second-order approximation of its equilibrium conditions
around the deterministic steady-state levels of its variables, both the variances of shocks and
the monetary policy rule (which in°uences how the shocks are transmitted to the economy)
can a®ect the means of the endogenous variables of the economy. Table 3 shows the average
levels of various endogenous variables, and the standard deviations of the same variables,
for the deterministic steady state and for the same monetary policy scenarios as reported in
Table 2.
17It is also possible to summarize the extent to which the gains in welfare come from the
e®ects of the change in policy regarding the levels of consumption, leisure, and real balances
versus changes in the volatility of these variables. We can approximate the di®erence between
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where zt ´ (Ct;m t;h t) is the vector of arguments of the utility function, z is the value of
these arguments in the deterministic steady state, and variables with hats measure deviations
from their levels in the deterministic steady state. This implies:
E (u(z
¤
t)) = E (u(zt)) + uzE (^ z
¤





t ¡ ^ zt)
0 uzz (^ z
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t ¡ ^ zt):
This allows us to decompose the gains in welfare from optimal monetary policy into a level
e®ect and a stabilization e®ect. We de¯ne the level e®ect as:
E fu(Ct(1 + ³L);m t;h t)g = Eu(zt)+uzE (^ z
¤
t ¡ ^ zt);
and we de¯ne the stabilization e®ect as:





t ¡ ^ zt)
0 uzz (^ z
¤
t ¡ ^ zt): (52)
The last two rows of Table 3 show the results. The overall e®ect in all cases is such that,
approximately:
(1 + ³) ¼ (1 + ³L)(1 + ³S): (53)
The most important result is that the welfare gain from optimizing the Taylor rule coe±cients
comes from the level e®ect. In fact, period utility becomes more volatile with the optimal
Taylor rule coe±cients than with their historical values. Hours worked are slightly more
volatile, consumption is slightly less volatile, and real balances are much more volatile under
the optimal Taylor rule. This implies that the welfare gain due to the stabilization e®ect
is actually negative. From the top three rows of Table 3, it is clear that much of the level
e®ect comes from an increase in real money balances. The increase in the average level of
consumption from the initial stochastic steady state is 0.87 per cent, whereas the level e®ect
component of the compensating variation is over 2 per cent. Since hours worked increase
slightly, the component of the compensating variation due to the increase in the average level
of real balances is well over 1 per cent. As discussed in subsection 4.2, this suggests that
misleading results could be obtained by neglecting the e®ects on welfare of the transition
from the initial steady state to the ¯nal steady state of the model.
184.2 Transition costs
By maximizing unconditional welfare, we are implicitly maximizing welfare in the stochastic
steady state. The welfare comparison ignores the possibility of losses in welfare on the
transition path from one steady state to another. The possibility is potentially acute for
open economies. Welfare in the new steady state with optimal policy may be higher because
a higher level of net foreign assets allows individuals to enjoy a higher level of consumption.
Acquiring the additional foreign assets, however, implies a lower level of consumption in
the short run. The short-term loss may even swamp the long-term gain if individuals are
su±ciently impatient and if this impatience is re°ected in the social welfare function.
In our model, much of the increase in welfare comes from an increase in the level of real
money balances. Table 3 shows that average consumption increases slightly, average hours
worked increase slightly (which implies a small loss in welfare), and there is a substantial
increase in real money balances. For a small open economy, the costs of acquiring these
additional real assets di®er, of course, from the costs of increasing the level of net foreign
assets. An increase in real balances can arise from a fall in the overall price level, without
a direct sacri¯ce of consumption in the short run. To analyze the impact on welfare of the
transition to the ¯nal steady state, we conduct the following Monte Carlo experiment with
1000 replications. For each replication, we draw new values of the model's shocks from a
multivariate normal distribution, and of the model's structural parameters given our point
estimates and the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the model's shocks. We then
simulate the model's response to the shocks, having starting values for its predetermined
state variables equal to their means in the stochastic steady state with the historical values
of the Taylor rule coe±cients.
Figure 4 shows the results. Period utility is measured on the vertical axis. The dotted
lines indicate the average level of period utility under the historical Taylor rule and under
the optimized Taylor rule. The solid line shows the average of period utility across the 1000
di®erent replications, with 90 per cent con¯dence bands around this mean response given by
the dashed lines. The graph indicates clearly that no short-term costs are associated with
moving to the optimal monetary policy. Welfare increases even in the period immediately
after the implementation of the new monetary policy.
5. Conclusions
We have shown that it is feasible to construct a fully developed NOEM model of a small open
economy such as Canada, to estimate almost all of its parameters using maximum-likelihood
techniques, and to use the model to analyze optimal monetary policy by calculating the
values of the Taylor rule coe±cients that maximize unconditional welfare. The time is
perhaps not far o® when central banks themselves will integrate the use of such models into
19the formulation of their monetary policy.
Our results show that it is possible to improve welfare substantially by getting the co-
e±cients of a modi¯ed Taylor rule right. The welfare increase is equivalent to a permanent
1.40 per cent increase in the level of consumption between the stochastic steady states with
the estimated values of the Taylor rule coe±cients and their optimal values. The welfare
function, however, is very steep in the neighbourhood of the optimum, and the location of
the maximum is sensitive to the structural values of the model. Small errors in parameter
estimates will, in general, lead to a much lower level of welfare. In addition, the optimal
Taylor rule coe±cients put the model quite close to the region of local indeterminacy. If the
Taylor rule coe±cients are restricted to place the economy further away from the region of
local indeterminacy, the welfare gains from optimal policy decrease substantially.
Much work remains to be done. We need to incorporate capital into the model, so that
it can better reproduce the persistence of some of the main macroeconomic aggregates. We
need to do more work on the di®erence between policies that maximize conditional versus
unconditional welfare. We need to work on deriving the truly optimal feedback rule and to
evaluate the welfare loss from using a Taylor rule that is necessarily an approximation of
the fully optimal rule. We need to analyze the problem of time consistency. Finally, we need
to examine whether the result that welfare gains are extremely sensitive to the coe±cients of
the optimal policy rule and to the structural parameters of the model is robust to di®erent
types of models.
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23Table 1: Parameter Estimates
Parameter Value Standard deviation t-stat p-value
Stochastic processes
½A 0.8797 0.0258 34.10 0.00
½b 0.6450 0.0453 14.24 0.00
½g 0.7919 0.0663 11.94 0.00
½¿ 0.4320 0.0961 4.50 0.00
½R¤ 0.8973 0.0200 44.87 0.00
½y¤ 0.8280 0.0412 20.10 0.00
½¼¤ 0.2054 0.0951 2.16 0.03
¾A 0.0204 0.0017 12.00 0.00
¾b 0.0718 0.0046 15.61 0.00
¾g 0.0072 0.0006 12.00 0.00
¾¿ 0.0251 0.0019 13.21 0.00
¾R¤ 0.0016 0.0001 16.00 0.00
¾y¤ 0.0066 0.0005 13.20 0.00
¾¼¤ 0.0018 0.0002 9.00 0.00
¾R 0.0109 0.0009 12.11 0.00
b 0.3532 0.0402 8.79 0.00
Nominal rigidity
dw 0.8257 0.0491 16.82 0.00
dp 0.4398 0.0479 9.18 0.00
dm 0.5508 0.0275 20.03 0.00
Interest rate rule
%¼ 1.0223 0.0863 11.85 0.00
%¹ 0.6567 0.0745 8.81 0.00
%y -0.0147 0.0498 -0.30 0.76
Foreign supply/demand
®x 0.074 Calibrated
' -0.0204 0.0311 -0.66 0.51
& 0.5962 0.0288 20.70 0.00
Production
º y 0.5962 0.0288 20.70 0.00
®d 0.6406 0.0616 10.40 0.00





° 0.3561 0.0354 10.06 0.00
¯ 0.99 Calibrated
´ 1.35 Calibrated
y | º was constrained to equal &
24Table 2: Optimized Taylor Rule Coe±cients
Historical Base case In°ation
stabilization
%¼ 1.0223 1.2000 30.0000
%¹ 0.6567 0.0000 |
%y -0.0147 0.2000 |
CV¤ | 1.3976 0.7322
¤: Compensating variation in per cent
25Table 3: Average Values and Standard Deviations
Deterministic Initial stochastic Optimal stochastic In°ation
steady state steady state steady state stabilization
Averages
Consumption 0.0805 0.0804 0.0811 0.0812
Hours worked 0.3230 0.3238 0.3254 0.3265
Real balances 0.1374 0.1392 0.2478 0.2335
Period utility -3.0572 -3.0608 -3.0472 -3.0537
Standard deviations
Consumption | 0.0025 0.0023 0.0059
Hours worked | 0.0092 0.0098 0.0147
Real balances | 0.0080 0.0764 0.0856
Period utility | 0.0367 0.0495 0.0614
Compensating variations
CVy 0.3716 | 1.3976 0.7322
Level e®ect 0.2876 | 2.1865 1.8932
Stabilization e®ect 0.0843 | -0.7718 -1.1404
y: Compensating variation in per cent
2
6Figure 1: Fitted and Actual Values
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29Figure 4: Fitted and Actual Values
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30Appendix A: Data and Data Sources
Our data set is available upon request. The data are from Canada and the United States
and are quarterly from 1981Q3 to 2002Q4. The Canadian data are from Bank of Canada
Banking and Financial Statistics, a monthly publication by the Bank of Canada. Series
numbers are indicated in brackets and correspond to CANSIM databank numbers.
² Consumption, Ct, is measured by real personal spending on non-durable goods and
services in 1997 dollars (non-durables [v1992047] + services [v1992119]).
² The CPI in°ation rate, ¼t, is measured by changes in the consumer price index, Pt
[v18702611].
² The short-term nominal interest rate, Rt, is measured by the yield on Canadian three-
month treasury bills [v122531].
² Government spending, Gt, is measured by government expenditures on goods and ser-
vices (total domestic demand [v1992068] ¡ total personal expenditures [v1992115] ¡
construction [v1992053 + v1992055] ¡ machinery and equipment investment [v1992056]).
² The labour tax rate, ¿t, is measured by the e®ective labour tax rate (calculated follow-
ing the methodology of Jones 2002; and Mendoza, Razin, and Tezar 1994).
² The series in per-capita terms are obtained by dividing each series by the Canadian
civilian population aged 15 and over (civilian labour force [v2062810]=labour force
participation [v2062816]).
The U.S. data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, with the series numbers
in brackets. The world series are approximated by some of the U.S. series.
² World output, Y ¤
t , is real U.S. GDP per capita in 1996 dollars [GDPC96] divided by
the U.S. civilian non-institutional population [CNP16OV].
² The world nominal interest rate, R¤
t, is measured by the rate on U.S. three-month
Treasury bills [TB3MS].
² The world in°ation rate, ¼¤
t, is measured by changes in the U.S. GDP implicit price
de°ator, P ¤
t [GDPDEF].
31Appendix B: Equilibrium Conditions
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log(At)=( 1¡ ½A)log(A)+½A log(At¡1)+"At; (B.77)
log(bt)=( 1¡ ½b)log(b)+½b log(bt¡1)+"bt; (B.78)
log(Gt)=( 1¡ ½g)log(G)+½g log(Gt¡1)+"gt; (B.79)



















Equation (B.20) gives the trade balance of the economy.
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